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While the signalling hypothesis has played a prominent role as the economic 
rationale associated with the initial public offering (IPO) underpricing puzzle 
(Welch, 1989), the empirical evidence on it has been mixed at best (Jegadeesh, 
Weinstein and Welch, 1993; Michaely and Shaw, 1994). This paper revisits the 
issue from the vantage point of close to two decades of additional experience by 
examining a sample of foreign IPOs – firms from both financially integrated and 
segmented markets – in US markets. The evidence indicates that signalling does 
matter in determining IPO underpricing, especially for firms domiciled in 
countries with segmented markets, which as a result face higher information 
asymmetry and lack access to external capital markets. We find a significant 
positive and robust relationship between the degree of IPO underpricing and 
segmented-market firms’ seasoned equity offering activities. For firms from 
integrated markets, in contrast, the analyst-coverage-purchase hypothesis appears 
to matter more in explaining IPO underpricing and the aftermarket price 
appreciation explains these firms’ seasoned equity offering activities. The 
evidence, therefore, clearly supports the notion that some firms are willing to 
leave money on the table voluntarily to get a more favorable price at seasoned 
offerings when they are substantially wealth constrained, a prediction embedded 
in the signalling hypothesis. 
 
Keywords: IPO underpricing, seasoned equity offering, cross-listing, signalling 
hypothesis, financial market integration, market-feedback hypothesis 
 
JEL classification numbers: G14, G15, G30, G32  
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Saako signalointihypoteesi empiiristä tukea ulkomailla 
toteutettavista listautumisanneista? 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 10/2008 
Bill B Francis – Iftekhar Hasan – James R Lothian – Xian Sun 




Signalointihypoteesia on pidetty listautumisantien yhteydessä esiintyvän alihin-
noitteluongelman yhtenä merkittävänä teoreettisena selityksenä samaan aikaan, 
kun tutkijat väittelevät sen empiirisestä merkityksestä. Tässä tutkimuksessa kysy-
mystä tarkastellaan empiirisesti Yhdysvaltain osakemarkkinoilta lähes kahden 
vuosikymmenen ajalta kerättyjen ulkomailta toteutettujen listautumisantien yhtey-
dessä. Listautumisanteihin liittyviä tietoja on kerätty sekä integroituneilla että 
segmentoiduilla markkinoilla toimivista yrityksistä. Empiirisen näytön mukaan 
signalointi vaikuttaa listautumisantien yhteydessä havaittavaan alihinnoitteluun 
erityisesti segmentoiduilla markkinoilla toimivien yritysten tapauksessa. Tästä on 
seurauksena, että tällaiset yritykset kärsivät informaation epäsymmetrisyydestä ja 
rajoitetusta pääsystä kansainvälisille pääomamarkkinoille. Tulosten mukaan lis-
tautumisannissa havaittavan alihinnoittelun määrän ja segmentoituneilla markki-
noilla toimivien yritysten osakemyyntiaktiivisuuden välillä on tilastollisesti 
merkitsevä ja vankka korrelaatio. Mahdollisuus hankkia asiantuntija-arvioon 
perustuva ostosuositus sen sijaan selittää integroituneilla osakemarkkinoilla 
toimivien yritysten listautumisantien alihinnoittelua. Osakkeiden hintojen nousu 
jälkeenpäin puolestaan selittää näiden yritysten halukkuutta listautumisantien 
jälkeiseen osakemyyntiin. Tutkimustulosten mukaan jotkin yritykset ovat siis näh-
tävästi valmiita luopumaan hetkellisistä kurssivoitoista varmistaakseen osakkeil-
leen paremman hinnan listautumisantien jälkeisissä osakemyynneissä, jolloin 
näiden yritysten pääomantarve on suurin. Tämä tulkinta on sopusoinnussa 
signalointihypoteesin kanssa. 
 
Avainsanat: listautumisantien alihinnoittelu, osakemyynti, ristiinlistautuminen, 
signalointihypoteesi, rahoitusmarkkinoiden integraatio, markkinareaktio 
 
JEL-luokittelu: G14, G15, G30, G32  
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The reasons that initial public offerings (IPOs) of equity are on average 
underpriced have received substantial attention in the literature since Stoll and 
Curley (1970), Logue (1973), and Ibbotson (1975) first documented systematic 
increases from the offer price to the first-day closing price. A number of 
hypotheses have been proposed to explain this phenomenon. For instance, Welch 
(1989) proposes a signalling model in which ‘high-quality’ firms underprice their 
IPOs to credibly separate themselves from ‘low-quality’ firms and then recoup 
benefits from seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) thereafter.
1 The important 
underlying assumptions in his model, as well as others, are that issuing firms have 
superior information to outside investors and/or underwriters and these firms are 
so wealth-constrained that they explicitly consider the possibility of future equity 
offerings in deciding on the prices of their IPOs. 
  The existing evidence with regard to signalling theories, however, is at best 
mixed. Jegadeesh, Weinstein and Welch (1993) find that, although there is a 
positive relationship between the degree of IPO underpricing and the probability 
and size of subsequent SEOs, the economic significance of these relationships is 
weak. Instead, they find that an alternative hypothesis, which they term the 
‘market-feedback hypothesis’, has a stronger explanatory power for firms’ 
subsequent equity issuing activities. Michaely and Shaw (1994), for their part, 
reject the signalling hypothesis completely. 
  We believe, however, that the signalling hypothesis is worthy of being 
revisited before it is written off entirely. According to Welch (1989), it is not 
necessary that all issuers be willing to apply the signalling strategy. In models like 
his, high-quality firms that choose the strategy of leaving more money on the table 
at their IPO to signal their true quality are subject to several conditions. One 
important condition is that there is an ongoing need for these firms to raise funds, 
thus making it more likely that they will raise external capital (issue equity) in the 
future. As such, high-quality firms that really want to raise external capital may 
apply a signalling strategy to reduce as much as possible the total cost of capital 
raised. This conjecture is consistent with Ibbotson (1975) who proposes that new 
issues may be underpriced because issuers want to leave a ‘good taste in 
investors’ mouths’ so that they could sell their future offerings at more attractive 
                                                 
1 There were other signalling models proposed around the same time as Welch’s. Allen and 
Faulhaber (1989) assume good managers underprice to distinguish themselves from bad managers 
because subsequent cash flows reveal the firm’s type. Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) develop a 
model in which the fraction of retained new issue by the issuer and the issuing price signal the true 
value of the firm. Nanda (1988) assumes firms with high-mean returns and low variances issue 
equity and underprice more to deter mimicking by low-mean return firms. Although these 
signalling models are interesting and important in the IPO literature, because we test the signalling 
hypothesis in which high quality firms recoup money left on the table through SEOs, we focus our 
discussion on Welch’s (1989) signalling model.  
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prices. In this vein, Ritter and Welch (2002) point out that the most appealing 
feature of the signalling hypothesis is that there are some issuers that voluntarily 
leave money on the table at IPOs to entice investors to pay higher prices at 
subsequent offerings. 
  To maximize the benefits of applying such a strategy, firms must issue equity 
multiple times.
2 Therefore, it is not necessary for all high-quality firms to apply 
this strategy, if they are not ‘so wealth constrained that they must raise the capital 
necessary to fund their operations.’
3 We conjecture that the problem underlying 
the very weak support empirically is the inability of researchers to identify firms 
that actually value underpricing as a signalling device and hence are willing to 
apply this time-intensive strategy. 
  We revisit the signalling hypothesis by studying a group of foreign-firm IPOs 
in US capital markets. We believe that this choice of data serves our objective for 
several reasons. First, foreign IPOs, in general, face higher information 
asymmetries than domestic IPOs. In this regard, Bruner, Chaplinsky and 
Ramchand (1999) suggest that foreign IPOs face a sizable challenge in making 
themselves known to the US investor community and hence incur much higher 
costs when they put on the required ‘road shows’. Everything else equal, foreign 
firms are, therefore, more likely to engage in a signalling strategy. 
  Second, in our sample, we have both foreign firms from financially integrated 
and segmented markets.
4 Firms from segmented markets arguably face 
particularly great difficulty in raising external capital and usually have less access 
to foreign capital.
5 For instance, Lins, Strickland, and Zenner (2005) document 
that those firms from emerging markets that issue American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs) express the need for access to external capital markets in their filing 
documents more frequently than their integrated-markets counterparts do.
6 To 
alleviate the direct (ownership restrictions, taxes) and indirect (information-
production and liquidity) barriers to the free flow of capital, firms from financially 
segmented markets can list in financially integrated markets. Doing so enables 
                                                 
2 The decision makers of the issuing firms, of course, could also enjoy the benefits by the open 
market trading of the insider shares when the true value is revealed to the investors. We consider it 
as a further incentive for the decision makers to signal via underpricing. 
3 Welch (1989, p. 424). 
4 To ensure that our results are not dependent on the method of the classification, we also split the 
IPOs by whether they are from emerging or developed markets and obtained qualitatively similar 
results. These results are available upon request. 
5 Another strand of studies in testing international capital-market integration, focus on the 
commonality in nominal returns or cost of capital across markets. This literature jointly tests the 
chosen asset-pricing model (eg CAPM) and the integration hypothesis. In this study, we focus on a 
more general concept of market segmentation from which average firms face limited access to 
foreign capital. 
6 ADRs are securities of foreign firms that list their securities on US capital markets as Depository 
Receipts normally as a multiple of domestic ordinary shares (such as 10 to 1) in order to bring the 
price into a more common US form. These receipts, which register with the SEC, trade like any 
other US security. For more details on the structure and costs of ADRs, see Miller (1999).  
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them to increase liquidity and to raise capital more easily. Therefore, although the 
process of integration is gradual at the market level, liberalization at the firm level 
should have a relatively faster pace due to the possibilities of cross-listing in 
developed markets. In short, if there is an incentive for some firms to apply a 
signalling strategy when issuing IPOs, this incentive should be significantly 
stronger for firms from segmented markets than those from integrated markets. 
  In this study, we examine the relationship between the initial returns of 
foreign IPOs that list on US capital markets and their subsequent decision to raise 
additional capital through a seasoned equity offering (SEO) in US capital markets. 
We focus on US markets primarily because collectively they represent the largest 
equity market in the world, thereby providing firms that choose to list in the US 
access to the largest pool of funds. Hence, by studying foreign IPOs affiliated 
with US capital markets, we are able to provide a much more powerful test of the 
signalling hypothesis. 
  We conduct our analyses using a sample of 413 foreign IPOs from 1985 to 
2000 and 70 follow-up SEOs issued within three years of the IPO date. These 
analyses reveal that the initial returns of foreign IPOs are significantly different 
between firms from financially integrated markets and firms from segmented 
markets. Firms from financially segmented markets experience initial returns of 
12.2%, while those from integrated markets experience initial returns of only 
7.8%, a difference that is statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, this 
difference, which is economically meaningful, remains after we control for other 
factors suggested in the literature as potentially important, such as analyst 
coverage. We find that, compared to firms from segmented markets, firms from 
integrated markets underprice more to purchase lead underwriters’ analyst 
coverage, a result consistent with the findings of Cliff and Denis (2004) for US 
domestic IPOs, but not the momentum hypothesis of Aggarwal, Krigman, and 
Womack (2002). For segmented-market firms, the level of underpricing is neither 
well explained by the analyst-coverage purchase hypothesis nor by the momentum 
hypothesis. 
  More importantly, consistent with the predictions of the signalling hypothesis, 
we find that firms from segmented markets that leave more money on the table at 
the IPO and therefore experience a higher level of underpricing are significantly 
more likely to: a) issue seasoned equity; b) raise a larger proportion of their 
capital requirements through SEOs; c) issue seasoned equity more quickly 
subsequent to the IPO; and d) experience a smaller price drop when the SEO is 
announced. Specifically, we find that a one percent increase in underpricing at 
their IPOs increases segmented-market firms’ likelihood of a seasoned equity 
offering by 32.3% (significant at the 1% level) and the average cumulative 
abnormal return by 0.156% (significant at the 1% level). The estimated 
coefficients (p-value) between underpricing and SEO size, and the time lag 
between the IPO and SEO are 1.032 (0.003) and -2.158 (0.001).  
10 
  To test the economic significance of these relations, we follow the same 
quintile analysis as Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch (1993) and find that for 
firms from segmented markets, there is a strong monotonic relation between IPO 
underpricing and their decision to issue an SEO within three years of going 
public. For firms from integrated markets, however, it is the stock price 
appreciation subsequent to the initial trading day (aftermarket price appreciation) 
that shows a significant relationship with their SEO decision. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 presents the empirical tests of 
IPO underpricing. Section 5 examines the relationship between the level of IPO 




We suspect that the lack of empirical support for the IPO signalling hypothesis 
stems from the difficulty that researchers face in identifying the group of firms 
that actually are likely to value underpricing as a signalling device and that as a 
result are willing to apply this lengthy and otherwise costly strategy. The reasons 
advanced in the literature why firms might engage in signalling of this sort, center 
around information costs and capital constraints. Foreign firms that issue equity in 
US capital markets and are from countries with segmented capital markets are 
much more likely to satisfy these criteria than US firms do. There is some existing 
evidence consistent with this conjecture. For example, Hargis (2000) reports that 
international share offerings, usually in the form of ADRs, become a major source 
of equity funding for firms from emerging markets subsequent to cross-listing. 
Miller (1999) and Foerster and Karolyi (1999) argue further that cross-listing 
reduces the effects of market segmentation, while Errunza and Miller (2000) 
document a decline in the cost of capital domestically for ADR-issuing firms. 
Lins, Strickland, and Zenner (2005) provide the first direct test of the importance 
of access to external capital markets for firms from segmented markets and find 
that this is one of the more important factors in determining a firm’s decision to 
cross-list in the US. 
  We, therefore, expect that if firms, in fact, willingly leave money on the table 
at their IPO in an effort to get a more favorable price for seasoned equity 
offerings, it will be firms from segmented markets since they have the strongest 
incentive to adopt a signalling strategy. Specifically, we expect that firms from 
segmented markets with higher IPO underpricing are more likely to: 1) issue 
seasoned equity; 2) raise a larger proportion of capital requirements through 
SEOs; 3) issue seasoned equity more quickly subsequent to the IPO; and 
4) receive less unfavorable stock-price responses following the announcements of  
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SEOs. In contrast, we expect these relationships to be weak to non-existent for 
firms from integrated markets. 
  We also test the alternative ‘market-feedback’ hypothesis as a potential 
explanation of their seasoned equity issuing activities. In addition, we examine the 
question of whether they underprice more to purchase lead underwriters’ analyst 
coverage (Cliff and Denis, 2004) and/or if they underprice more to create 
momentum (Aggarwal, Krigman and Womack, 2002). 
 
 
3  Data and summary statistics 
3.1 Data  construction 
We obtain our sample of foreign IPOs and SEOs in the US markets from the 
Securities Data Corporation Worldwide New Issues Data Bases (SDC). This 
database provides country origin, offer price, offering type (IPO/SEO and ADRs), 
proceeds in the US market, firms primary SIC code, book-runner and all managers 
of the issues, venture-backed IPO flags, and the issuer’s exchange listing. Only 
issues by firms domiciled outside the US are included in our sample. The IPO 
sample covers the period 1985 through 2000, and the SEO sample includes issues 
within three years of the IPO date. We only include the first SEO of the firms in 
our IPO sample. We obtain data on stock prices and returns from CRSP and 
exclude offerings for which the stock data are incomplete. Our final data set 
consists of 413 foreign IPOs and 70 SEOs.
7 We obtain information on the number 
of analysts providing recommendations from the Institutional Broker Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S). I/B/E/S only started tracking information on analyst 
recommendations in 1993, thus tests that require these data use a reduced sample. 
 
 
3.2  Measurement of financial market integration 
It is well known that measuring capital account liberalization is difficult. Some 
researchers conduct studies focusing on dating financial liberalizations and treat 
them as one-time events or structural breaks (see eg Bekaert and Harvey, 1995). 
In this study, we use the Bekaert and Harvey’s procedure to identify whether the 
IPOs are from segmented or integrated financial markets. Specifically, if the 
country has a fully integrated financial market, we define it as Integrated; we 
                                                 
7 SDC provides about 1,000 listings of foreign IPOs from 1985 to 2000. However, a closer 
examination indicates that only 429 of the offerings listed on major US stock exchange (NYSE 
and AMEX) or NASDAQ.  
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define all other markets as Segmented. In order to provide a more complete list of 
emerging markets, we complement the list of countries identified in Bekaert and 
Harvey with countries identified in Edison and Warnock (2001). These latter 
authors, however, use a continuous measure for determining financial integration. 
To maintain consistency with the dichotomous Bekaert and Harvey measure, we 
define countries that Edison and Warnock designate as fully integrated as 
Integrated and the rest as Segmented.
8 Based on these definitions, we separate our 
sample of IPOs into two groups, the first consisting of firms from fully financially 
integrated markets, the other consisting of firms from segmented markets.
9 
  Several countries are not identified in either of the studies mentioned above. 
Some of these are developing countries, which based on the criteria used by 
Bekaert and Harvey (1995) and/or Edison and Warnock (2003), fall into the 
segmented-market group. Others appear to experience a transformation from 
segmented to integrated, during our sample period and their official openness 
dates are not clear. For example, neither study identifies Israel. According to 
various documents released by the Israeli-press, however, Israel appears to have 
started the process of financial market liberalization in 1996 and achieved 
complete capital market integration by 2000. Because most of the transactions 
involving Israeli-targets are before 1997, we consider Israel to be a segmented 




3.3 Summary  statistics 
Table 1 presents the distributions of foreign IPOs and SEOs by the type of 
financial market (integrated vs segmented) and by country origin. Of the 413 
foreign IPOs, 209 (50.6%) are from financially segmented markets and 204 
(49.4%) from integrated markets. There are 70 SEOs issued by our IPO firms 
within 3 years of the IPO date, of which 37 are by firms from segmented markets 
and 33 by firms from integrated markets. The IPOs raised about 36.9 billion US 
dollars over the sample period, of which $20.3 billion (or 55%) was raised by 
                                                 
8 Edison and Warnock (2003) construct an index of financial-market openness with values ranging 
from 0 to 1 depending upon the degree of openness with 0 denoting a closed market and 1 
denoting a fully integrated market. Bekaert and Harvey (1995) and Edison and Warnock (2003) 
classify the same countries as having fully integrated markets. Edison and Warnock, however, 
cover more countries with segmented markets than do Bekaert and Harvey. 
9 We choose the dichotomous variable because it provides a greater coverage of countries. We also 
conducted our analyses using the continuous variable and our main results remain qualitatively the 
same. 
10 In our sample, there are 81 IPOs from Israel and of these 51 were issued between 1985 and 1996 
and 30 were between 1997 and 2000. If we classify those that were issued before 1997 as from a 
segmented market and those after 1996 as from an integrated market, our results remain 
qualitatively the same. Similar results were also obtained if we include a dummy variable for IPOS 
from Israel.  
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segmented-market firms and $16.6 billion (45%) by integrated-market firms, 
while SEOs raised about $10 billion, of which $5.9 billion (59% of the total) was 
raised by segmented-market firms and $4.1 billion (the remaining 41%) by 
integrated-market firms. 
  Table 1 also shows summary statistics of IPO underpricing and SEO 
announcement effects. UP is our measure of IPO underpricing and is calculated as 
[(P1–P0)/P0]*100, where P1 is the first day closing price and P0 is the initial offer 
price. CARs is the three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the SEO 
announcement date. Firms from India experience the highest level of underpricing 




4  Underpricing of foreign IPOs 
Panel A of Table 2 presents additional summary statistics for the IPOs contained 
in the sample. Among the 413 IPOs, 151 are identified by the SDC database as 
ADRs, of which 85 are from integrated markets and 66 from segmented markets. 
The average underpricing for the IPO sample firms is 10.1%. IPOs from 
segmented markets experience about 12.2% average underpricing, while those 
from integrated markets experience about 7.8%.
11 The difference between these 
two average initial returns is significant at the 1% level.
12 Our measure of 
underwriter rank (UWrank) is from Loughran and Ritter (2004). NYSE is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1, if an IPO is listed on the NYSE and 0 
otherwise. ADR is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the issue is an ADR and 
0 otherwise. Finally, Hi-tech is a dummy for IPOs issued by firms from high 
technology industries.
13 Surprisingly, segmented-market IPOs tend to be listed 
                                                 
11 We also separated the sample into ADR and non-ADR IPOs; we found that the signalling 
hypothesis was noticeably stronger for the non-ADR IPOs. We then partitioned the non-ADR 
sample into firms from integrated and segmented markets, the results were even stronger for firms 
from segmented markets than for the non-ADR sample as a whole. These results for the non-ADR 
sample are consistent with the theoretical arguments of the signalling hypothesis addressed in this 
paper. That is, firms from segmented markets that issue non-ADR IPOs are probably those that 
would have the most difficulties raising funds domestically and who, going forward, would benefit 
the most from signalling. This is the case because it has been shown that, on average, non-ADR 
firms that cross-list in the US tend to be smaller and younger than ADR firms. 
12 During the 1999–2000, bubble period, 50 out of the 413 IPOs in our sample came to the US 
market. Although we find that IPOs during the bubble period are more underpriced than those 
before the bubble period, the difference in the underpricing of integrated-market IPOs and 
segmented-market IPOs is in the same direction and significance before and during the bubble 
period. Specifically, segmented-market IPOs underprice 26.8% during the bubble period, which is 
significantly higher than the 11.6% of the integrated-market IPOs. Before the bubble period, 
segmented-market IPOs underprice 9.66%, which is significantly higher than the 7.45% of the 
integrated-market IPOs. 
13 We obtain high technology SIC codes from Loughran and Ritter (2004).  
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more frequently on the NYSE compared to those from integrated markets. In 
addition, segmented-market firms are more likely to be in the hi-tech industry. On 
the other hand, integrated-market firms are more likely to enter the US capital 
markets as ADRs. 
  Panel B of table 2 reports summary statistics for the SEOs. Consistent with 
the literature on domestic SEOs, SEOs by foreign issuers also experience a 
negative average abnormal return. Somewhat surprisingly, we observe no 
significant difference for announcement effects between segmented- and 
integrated-market firms in the SEO sample. 
  Table 3 presents results from the cross-sectional analyses of the underpricing 
of the sample IPO firms. In addition to the dummy variable for financial market 
integration, we regress underpricing against the following variables: 
 
  Income level (GDP), a variable that ranges in value from 1 to 4 and represents 
low income, lower-middle income, higher-middle income and high income. 
 
  Legal system (Legal), a variable that ranges in value from 1 to 3 and 
represents the French system, the German and Scandinavian systems, and the 
English system. 
 
  The natural logarithm of the size of the initial offering (Lnsize). 
 
  Venture capital funding (Venture), a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
the IPO is venture capitalist backed and 0 otherwise. 
 
  The standard deviation of returns (STDV) estimated over days 1 to 100 after 
the IPO, which is our proxy for the risk of the underlying stock. 
 
  Managers (CoMgrs), a variable that refers to the number of co-managers in 
the IPO syndicate. 
 
  UWrank, Hi-tech, NYSE and ADR, all of which we defined earlier. 
 
We include four governance indicators as control variables. This is motivated by 
the work of Lothian (2006), Bekaert and Harvey (2002), Henry (2000), among 
others, that show that institutional factors affect financial behavior. The variables 
taken from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) are measured in units 
ranging -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance 
outcomes.
14 They are: 
                                                 
14 For detailed explanation of these variables, see Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999).  
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  Voice accountability (VoiceAcc), which measures freedom of speech, 
freedom of association, freedom of the media, and the extent to which a 
country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government. 
 
  Political stability (PolStab), which is the perceived likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means, including political violence and terrorism. 
 
  Government effectiveness (GovEff), which aggregates the quality of public 
service provisions, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil 
servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and 
the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies into a single 
grouping and thus focuses on the inputs required for the government to be 
able to produce and implement good policies. 
 
  Corruption controls (CrptnCntl), which measures the success of controlling 
the exercise of public power for private gain. 
 
Table 3 contains our first set of regression results. Models 1 to 7 include all 
observations in the sample with the available requisite data. In Models 8 and 9, we 
separate the sample of IPOs into those from integrated markets and those from 
segmented markets. Results of Model 1 show that financial market integration has 
a negative and significant relationship with underpricing. Specifically, issuing 
firms from financially integrated markets experience a 4.3% lower level of 
underpricing compared to their segmented-market counterparts. This difference is 
both economically large and statistically significant. Importantly, this result 
remains after we control for other possible effects as shown in Models 2 through 
7. Consistent with prior studies of IPO underpricing in domestic markets (see eg 
Michaely and Shaw, 1994, among others), we find that foreign IPOs managed by 
underwriters that are more reputable are associated with less underpricing. 
Specifically, the use of prestigious underwriters significantly reduces the level of 
underpricing by about 1%. The location that the foreign IPOs list also has a 
significant relation with underpricing. We find that foreign IPOs listed on the 
NYSE exchange experience significantly lower underpricing. Finally, consistent 
with the existing literature (eg Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch, 1993) our results 
from Models 1 to 7 show that the standard deviation of returns of IPOs over days 
1 to 100 has a significant and positive relation with underpricing. 
  Models 8 and 9 of Table 3, report results based on data sorted by financial 
market integration status. We find that for IPOs from integrated markets, issue 
size has a positive and significant effect on underpricing. In contrast, the ranking 
of underwriters and NYSE listing have a negative and significant effect. Note that 
except for the standard deviation of returns, our proxy for the riskiness of equity,  
16 
none of the firm- and/or deal- specific factors contributes in explaining the 
underpricing of segmented-market IPOs. 
  The recent IPO literature contends that firms underprice more to purchase 
analyst coverage.
15 Cliff and Denis (2004)’s paper is one of the first to examine 
the relation between IPO underpricing and post-analyst coverage. They find that 
there is a positive and significant relation between underpricing and analyst 
coverage by the lead underwriter. They argue that if firms value analyst coverage, 
they will allocate resources to acquire this coverage by leaving money on the 
table. The lead underwriter, who can serve as the primary market maker, can 
benefit from underpricing by allocating IPOs to preferred clients. Lang, Lins and 
Miller (2003) provide evidence consistent with the notion that foreign firms that 
cross-list in the US value analyst coverage because of the resultant increase in 
valuation and forecast accuracy. 
  Chemmanur (1993) and Aggarwal, Krigman and Womack (2002) examine an 
alternative hypothesis that also relates IPO underpricing to analyst coverage. They 
hypothesize that firms underprice more to attract attention from the market and to 
create ‘momentum.’ The ‘hot’ IPO, they claim, will have more analysts following 
it, thereby enhancing liquidity. 
  Before testing the signalling hypothesis, we provide evidence on both of these 
hypotheses. Specifically, we examine i) whether the purchase of lead analysts’ 
coverage explains foreign IPO underpricing; and ii) whether there is a relation 
between the number of recommendations by non-lead analysts and underpricing. 
  Table 4 presents summary statistics for the sample of analysts’ 
recommendations that we were able to match with our IPO sample firms sorted by 
IPO underpricing quintiles. Because analysts’ recommendations are only available 
in I/B/E/S starting in 1993, the number of observations is reduced from 413 to 
335. Of these, 162 are from integrated markets and 173 from segmented markets. 
The variables shown in Table 4 are as follows. 
 
  The percentage of recommendations offered by the lead underwriters 
(LeadMgr Recom) within one year of the IPO date. 
 
  The number of analysts providing recommendations to the firms within one 
year of the IPO date (No Analysts1). 
 
  Average recommendation for the firm within one year of going public 
(AvgRecom1), and it ranges from 1 to 5, where 5 refers to ‘Strong Buy’ and 1 
refers to ‘Strong Sell’. 
 
                                                 
15 Analyst coverage here refers to earnings forecasts and/or recommendations made by analysts.  
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  The total number of recommendations offered within one year of the IPO date 
(No Recom1). 
 
  The number of analysts following the firm within three years of the IPO date 
(No Analysts3). 
 
  The average recommendation for the firms within three years of the IPO 
(AvgRecom3) and ranges from 1 to 5, where 5 refers to ‘Strong Buy’ and 1 
refers to ‘Strong Sell’. 
 
  The total number of recommendations offered by analysts following the firm 
within three years of its IPO (No Recom3). 
 
Although the relationship is not monotonic, the results in Table 4 indicate that, in 
general, segmented-market IPOs do not leave more money on the table for analyst 
coverage from lead underwriters, a finding that is not consistent with the analyst – 
coverage purchase hypothesis of Cliff and Denis (2004). Interestingly, when these 
firms are more underpriced they tend to have a higher level of recommendation at 
both the one-year and three-year time horizons following the IPO. In contrast to 
the IPOs from segmented markets, IPOs from integrated markets appear to leave 
more money on the table for analyst coverage from lead underwriters. Thus, there 
appears to be some support for the analyst-coverage purchase hypothesis for 
integrated-market IPOs. A more important finding from the standpoint of this 
paper is the positive relation between the level of analyst recommendations and 
the degree of underpricing of segmented-market IPOs in that it provides support 
for the signalling hypothesis as an explanation for segmented-market IPOs pricing 
strategy. 
  To see how robust these results are we use cross-sectional regression analysis 
and include controls for other factors known to have an impact on analyst 
coverage. Additionally, we present evidence on the momentum hypothesis of 
Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002). Because we can only test the 
hypotheses with firms that receive analyst recommendations, the results would be 
biased if firms that did not receive analyst recommendations are significantly 
different from those that did. To correct for the possible self-selection bias we use 
the Heckman two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we estimate a probit model 
where we set the dependent variable, Recommendation, equal to 1 if the firm 
receives at least one recommendation in the first year subsequent to the IPO, 0 
otherwise. In the second stage, we use OLS corrected for self-selection bias to 
examine the relationship between underpricing and the number of 
recommendations from the lead underwriters (the analyst-coverage purchase 
hypothesis), and from the non-lead underwriters (the momentum hypothesis) in 
the year after the IPO.  
18 
  The estimated models have the following specification 
 
Stage 1: 
ε + β + β +
β + β + β + β + α =
) NYSE ( ) Venture (
) Hitech ( ) UWrank ( ) LnSize ( ) GDP ( on commendati Re
6 5
4 3 2 1  (4.1) 
 
Stage 2: 
ε + β + β + β +
β + β + β + β + α =
) Lambda ( ) UP ( ) Turnover (
) CoMgrs ( ) Hitech ( ) UWrank ( ) LnSize ( com Re No
7 6 5
4 3 2 1  (4.2) 
 
In (4.2), the dependent variable, No Recom, refers to the number of 
recommendations from the lead underwriters when we test the analyst-coverage 
purchase hypothesis and it refers to the number of recommendations from the 
non-lead underwriters when we test the momentum hypothesis. We use Turnover, 
measured as the average amount of trading volume in the first year as a 
percentage of the shares offered at the IPO to control for the impact of trading 
volume. Lambda is the inverse of Mills ratio obtained from the probit equation 
and is used to correct for self-selectivity bias. All other variables including those 
in equation (4.1) are as defined earlier. 
  Table 5 contains results of equation (4.2), where for comparison purposes we 
also present OLS results uncorrected for self-selection bias. To conserve space we 
do not report the results of the probit model (the first stage). In Models 1 to 4 we 
test the analyst-coverage hypothesis of Cliff and Denis (2004) and in Models 5 to 
8 we test the momentum hypothesis of Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002). 
  The results from Models 1 to 4 indicate that there is a positive and significant 
relation between underpricing and the number of recommendations made by 
analysts from lead underwriters for integrated-market IPOs,
16 irrespective of 
whether or not we correct for self-selection bias. The results for integrated-market 
IPOs support the analyst-coverage purchase hypothesis of Cliff and Denis (2004), 
indicating that integrated-market firms use underpricing, at least in part, to 
compensate for expected analyst recommendations from lead underwriters. The 
same pattern does not exist in the group of segmented-market IPOs. In Models 5 
through 8 in which we test the momentum hypothesis, we obtain different results. 
Only in the case of Model 8 (which is uncorrected for self-selection bias and 
                                                 
16 Based on the suggestion of the referee we also examined whether recommendations from lead 
underwriters are positively biased compared to the consensus (in this case, the consensus is analyst 
coverage from the investment banks other than the lead). In results not reported, we find that the 
average recommendation by analysts of the lead underwriter is 4.4 (5 denotes strong buy and 1 
denotes strong sell) and is significantly higher than the average recommendation by analysts of 
non-lead underwriters, which is 4.1. Furthermore, the lead underwriters do not offer more biased 
recommendations for integrated-market IPOs than for segmented-market IPOs. Similar results 
hold for ADRs and non-ADRs.  
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hence questionable) is the underpricing variable significant. Thus, these results do 
not provide support for the hypothesis that foreign IPOs strategically underprice 
to attract investor attention. 
  In sum, the results presented so far indicate that firms from segmented 
markets that issue IPOs, underprice more than firms from integrated markets. 
However, none of the alternative hypotheses is successful in explaining the 
greater degree of underpricing that characterizes segmented-market firms. 
Accordingly, in the following sections, we test the signalling explanation of IPO 




5  Relation between IPO Underpricing and SEOs 
As specified above, the signalling hypothesis predicts that firms with higher 
underpricing are more likely to 1) issue SEOs; 2) issue a larger proportion of their 
capital requirements through SEOs; 3) issue SEOs more quickly after the IPO; 
and 4) experience less unfavorable announcement effects (see Jegadeesh, 
Weinstein, and Welch, 1993). We test each of these hypotheses in order. Viewed 
from the standpoint of the strictest version of the signalling theory, we should find 
support for these hypotheses in the full sample. However, as we argued above, we 
believe that firms from segmented markets are much more likely to provide 
support for these hypotheses. For firms from integrated markets, we expect that 
the market-feedback hypothesis (Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch, 1993) better 
explains the decision to issue SEO subsequent to the IPO, along with the size of 
the issue and the speed with which these firms return to the market. 
  Although not an integral part of the signalling model of Welch (1989), an 
implication of signalling models is that if firms choose the signalling strategy, 
then these firms should sell a smaller fraction of their shares at the IPO when a 
substantial amount of underpricing is expected.
17 To test this conjecture, we add a 
variable (FractionSold) that measures the proportion of the firm sold at the IPO.
18 
Following Leland and Pyle (1977), we define the percentage of a firm sold as the 
number of shares sold at the IPO divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding following the IPO. This information is not available for a significant 
number of IPOs in our sample. Consequently, the sample size reduces to 162 
when we include this variable in our regressions. The average fraction sold by 
IPOs in our sample is 29%. There is, however, no significant difference between 
firms from integrated markets and those from segmented markets. 
                                                 
17 We thank the referee for this suggestion. 
18 Note that FractionSold is not included in estimating the announcement effects of SEO issuers 




5.1  The probability of SEO and IPO underpricing 
We test the first hypothesis, that the probability of a foreign firm issuing seasoned 
equity is related to its IPO underpricing, by estimating the following logit model 
 
) e 1 /( e P
x x
i
μ + β + α μ + β + α + =  (5.1) 
 
where, Pi is the probability that the ith firm issues seasoned equity, and X is a 
column vector of independent variables. The independent variable of primary 
interest is IPO underpricing. In addition to the signalling hypotheses, Jegadeesh, 
Weinstein, and Welch (1993) propose an ‘aftermarket-return’ hypothesis, in 
which the market feedback following the IPO explains the probability of issuing 
SEOs better than does the degree of IPO underpricing. As pointed out earlier, 
underlying the market-feedback hypothesis is the notion that the market is better 
informed than are issuers. A high return on the IPO date, according to this view, 
indicates that the issuer has underestimated the marginal return to the project. 
Since the market-feedback hypothesis predicts that issuers do not deliberately 
leave money on the table but rather use aftermarket information in their decision 
to issue seasoned equity, it is important to control for market feedback in our 
regressions. 
  Following Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch (1993), we define the variable 
AFTRET1 as the abnormal returns over the period from trading day 1 to trading 
day 20 following the IPO date.
19 We estimate abnormal return as the difference 
between the actual return and the predicted return, which in turn is measured as 
beta times the market return. We use the CRSP equal-weighted index as the 
market proxy and estimate beta from a market model regression fitted over days 
41 to 140 following the IPO date. We calculate AFTRET2 in a similar fashion to 
AFTRET1 except that it covers the period from trading day 21 to trading day 40 
after the IPO date. We include ADR, LnSize, and FractionSold as control 
variables. We also include year and industry dummies to allow for potential 
differences in SEO activities across years and industries.
20 
                                                 
19 One could argue that to better define foreign stocks’ abnormal returns the local market index 
should be added in the market model. Instead of predicting the foreign IPO’s returns by adding a 
local market index for the 413 firms from 47 different markets, we rely on previous studies which 
show that cross-listing could reduce firms’ exposure to the local market risk (see eg Errunza and 
Losq, 1985, Alexander, Eun and Janakiramanan, 1987, and Foerster and Karolyi, 1999) and apply 
a single index market model when calculating the aftermarket abnormal returns. 
20 Year dummies and industry dummies are not included in the models that include FractionSold. 
Given the substantial reduction in the sample when we include this variable in the regression along 
with the large number of dummy variables, the model becomes unstable, thus rendering the results 
unreliable.  
21 
  Table 6 presents results of the logit regression estimations.
21 We report full 
sample results in columns 1 through 4. In all cases, there is a positive and 
significant relationship between the variable UP and the probability of a SEO. We 
report marginal effects in brackets below the p-values where they indicate that the 
effect is economically important. For the aftermarket return variables AFTRET1 
and AFTRET2 there is no evidence of a relationship between them and the 
likelihood of an SEO. However, consistent with our conjecture there is a negative 
and significant relationship between FractionSold and the likelihood of firms 
issuing SEOs subsequent to the IPO. 
  When we separate the full sample into integrated- and segmented-market 
groups, we gain important insights into the determinants of SEOs following IPOs. 
For integrated-market IPOs we obtain a coefficient (p-value) for UP of -0.258 
(0.877), while for segmented-market firms we obtain a coefficient of 2.524 
(0.003). The marginal effects indicate that for segmented-market firms, a one 
percent increase in underpricing at their IPO increases the likelihood of a 
seasoned equity offering by 32.3%. As is apparent from the coefficients, p-values 
and marginal effects, the strong positive relationship between the likelihood of a 
SEO and the degree of IPO underpricing shown by the IPOs from segmented 
markets does not exist for the group of integrated-market IPOs. Instead, for this 
group of firms, aftermarket price appreciation significantly explains the likelihood 
of a SEO.
22 Specifically, a one percent increase in the first 20 days’ aftermarket 
abnormal return increases integrated market firms’ likelihood of a SEO by 38.3%. 
The results remain qualitatively the same after we control for the year and 
industry dummies in Models 3, 6 and 9. 
  Models 7 and 10 show that for segmented-markets IPOs, FractionSold is 
negative and significant at the 1% level, and insignificant for IPOs from 
integrated markets. This indicates that the negative relationship between 
FractionSold and the likelihood of an SEO subsequent to an IPO found for the full 
sample is driven by segmented-market IPOs. This result suggests that along with 
the level of underpricing the percentage of the firm sold at the IPO can and is 
being used as a signal by the segmented-market firms that plan follow-on SEOs. 
  The results contained in Table 6 provide strong support for the signalling 
hypothesis in that they suggest that firms from segmented markets are willing to 
leave more money on the table at their IPO to recoup benefits from seasoned 
equity issuances to meet their capital requirements. As we argued earlier, it is not 
necessary for all firms to apply a signalling strategy by underpricing more at the 
IPO, only those firms with high information asymmetry and with a strong need to 
access external capital markets. Firms from segmented markets fall into this 
                                                 
21 For the sake of brevity, we do not report the estimates of the coefficients of year and industry 
dummy variables. 
22 We also estimated separate regressions within and before the bubble period of 1999 to 2000. 
The results remained qualitatively the same.  
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category. In segmented markets, the average firm faces a relatively high cost of 
capital. In this regard, Lins, Strickland, and Zenner (2005) show that following a 
US listing, the sensitivity of investment to free cash flow decreases significantly 
for firms from emerging capital markets. They report further that these firms 
mention the need for access to external capital markets in their filing documents 
more frequently than their developed-market counterparts do. 
  Therefore, as we predict, consistent with the signalling hypothesis the more 
underpriced are the IPOs from these markets, the more likely they are to issue 
seasoned equity. In accord with our priors, we find no similar relationship for 
integrated-market firms. For these firms, aftermarket price appreciation explains 
the likelihood of SEO issuing – a result that is repeated consistently below. 
  In results not reported, we used a Tobit model to test the hypothesis that the 
size of a firm’s seasoned equity issue, measured as the size of the SEO as a 
proportion of the amount of capital raised by the firm at its IPO plus SEO. Using 
the same vector of independent variables as that used in the previous logit 
regressions, we find similar to the results of the probability of the follow-on SEO 
that for segmented-market firms, the variable UP has a positive and significant 
effect. For integrated-market firms, IPO underpricing has an insignificant effect. 
For this group of firms, aftermarket price appreciation is again the key 
explanatory variable where we find AFTRET1 to be both economically and 
statistically significant. 
  In sum, the results for both the likelihood of a follow-on SEO and the size of 
the SEO issue indicate that IPOs from segmented markets are supportive of 
predictions 1 and 2 of the signalling hypothesis, while the results for IPOs from 
integrated markets are supportive of the market feedback hypothesis. 
 
 
5.2  Time lag between foreign IPO and the first SEO 
In this subsection, we examine the relation between IPO underpricing and the 
time lag between the IPO and the first SEO. We contend that if firms voluntarily 
leave more money on the table because they plan to return to the equity market to 
raise capital at a more favorable price, the time lag between the IPO and the first 
SEO should be shorter for firms following this strategy than for other firms. 
  Welch (1996) develops a model in which the ‘timing’ of the offering becomes 
endogenous. He contends that it is more realistic to assume that issuers decide 
when to issue and that high-quality firms in general underprice more and wait 
longer for their follow-up SEOs in an effort to increase the possibility that low-
quality firms will be revealed. We would argue, however, that foreign IPOs – 
especially those from segmented capital markets – unlike US domestic IPOs, may 
not have the luxury of waiting for an extended period of time because, as Welch  
23 
notes, such firms by waiting too long may lose the benefit of timely funding and 
as a result experience a reduction in value.
23 We suspect, moreover, that timely 
funding is especially crucial for IPOs from segmented markets given that they are 
more likely to be financially constrained than IPOs from integrated markets (Lins, 
Strickland, and Zenner, 2005). Welch (1996) also points out that models such as 
those by Welch (1989), and Allen and Faulhaber (1989), which treat the timing of 
SEOs as exogenous, apply to firms that do not have internal funds or access to 
risk-free borrowing. This in turn is more likely to be the case for foreign IPOs, 
again particularly those from segmented markets. We, therefore, treat the ‘timing’ 
of an issue as exogenous in our analysis. 
  Because we truncate the sample used above by only selecting SEOs within 3 
years of the IPO date, we apply Tobit regression analysis in studying the time lag 
between IPOs and SEOs.
24 The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the 
time (measured in days) between the IPO and the SEO (LnGap). If there is no 
SEO within three years following the IPO, the dependent variable equals the 
natural logarithm of the maximum value of 1095 days (three years). For 
regressions using the full sample, there are 70 uncensored observations and 343 
right-censored observations. 
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The vector of explanatory variables (xi) is the same as that used in the previous 
logit regressions. 
  Table 7 presents the regression estimates. For the full sample, the slope 
coefficient estimate (p-value) of UP is -1.865 (0.001). This indicates that firms 
that underprice more at their IPO tend to return to capital markets quicker than 
other firms do. When we separate the sample into firms from segmented and 
integrated markets, the negative and significant relationship between underpricing 
and the time lag between the IPO and the first SEO is only found for the sub-
sample of segmented-market IPOs. For firms from integrated markets (Model 5), 
the slope coefficient (p-value) for UP is an insignificant -0.366 (0.766). However, 
                                                 
23 If firms do actually manipulate the timing of the disclosure, we should find that more 
underpriced firms wait longer to issue seasoned equity. To test the endogenous timing hypothesis, 
we collected all first SEOs of foreign IPOs without invoking the cutoff point of 3 years. Among 
the 101 SEOs collected, the longest waiting time between IPO and the first SEO is 9.59 years. In 
OLS analysis, the underpricing variable still has a negative and significant relationship with the 
length of time it takes the firm to return to the capital market. This result is consistent with our 
conjectures but opposite to the findings of Welch (1996). 
24 The results remain qualitatively the same if the SEO sample includes issues within two years (53 
SEOs) or within five years of the IPO date (89 SEOs).  
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for both AFTRET1 and AFRET2, the coefficients are both negative and 
significant (-2.792 (0.005) and -1.694 (0.050)). 
  These results are consistent with our previous results for segmented-market 
firms, in that only the degree of underpricing significantly reduces the time lag. 
Consistent with our expectations the coefficient on FractionSold is positive and 
significant, indicating that firms that sell more of their shares at the IPO wait 
significantly longer to issue SEOs. Similar to our earlier results, segmented-
market firms drive this finding, as only in the segmented-market sample (Model 
10) is the variable significant. 
 
 
5.3 Quintile  analysis 
To provide additional evidence, we follow Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch 
(1993) and partition the firms on the ranking of underpricing and aftermarket-
return. An advantage of this procedure, as Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch 
(1993) and Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) point out, is that it enables us to 
evaluate the economic significance of the results from the logit/Tobit regressions. 
For brevity, we only report results for the segmented-market sample.  
  Panel A of Table 8 presents the actual and predicted percentage of firms 
issuing SEOs within each quintile of underpricing and aftermarket-return. There is 
a clear monotonic relation between the likelihood of issuing SEOs and the degree 
of underpricing. In this group, about 9% of the firms in the lowest quintile issue 
SEOs and about 27% of the firms in the highest IPO underpricing quintile issue 
SEOs. The likelihood of issuing SEOs increases monotonically as the degree of 
underpricing increases. Consistent with the previous cross-sectional analysis, 
there is no relationship between the likelihood of issuing SEOs and the after-
market returns for segmented-market IPOs. 
  Panel B reports the actual and predicted mean SEO size (SeoSize) sorted by 
quintile of IPO underpricing and aftermarket–return. SeoSize is defined as the 
SEO issue size as a percentage of capital raised in both the IPO and SEO 
(SEO/(SEO+IPO)). For the segmented-market group, we find a clear monotonic 
relation between the IPO rankings based on underpricing and the mean SeoSize. 
The mean proportions of SeoSize for the lowest and largest IPO underpricing 
quintiles are 4.4% and 16.4%, respectively and the mean SeoSize is 
monotonically increasing across the three intermediate underpricing quintiles. 
  Panel C presents quintile analysis where we sort on time between the IPO and 
SEO. The results here are largely consistent with our Tobit regression results. 
Except for the lowest two quintiles, there appears to be a monotonic relation 
between quintile mean underpricing and average time between IPO and SEO for 
firms from segmented markets.  
25 
  To summarize, the results for the segmented-market IPOs contained in Table 
8 strongly support the signalling hypotheses. In additional results not reported, we 
find that for the sub-sample of firms from integrated markets, it is the after-market 
return variable AFRET1, that increases monotonically with the likelihood of 
issuing SEOs and is related to the size of the SEO. 
 
 
5.4  Market anticipation of SEOs 
Finally, in this subsection we examine the relation between the stock-price 
response to the announcement of SEOs and IPO underpricing. We contend that 
for segmented-market firms that underprice more at the IPO, the market should be 
less surprised by their SEO announcements and consequently the price decline 
normally associated with SEO announcements to be less severe than for IPOs 
from integrated markets. To test this implication of the signalling hypothesis, we 
regress the abnormal three-day returns due to the SEO announcement against the 
independent variables used in the previous regressions along with the following 
additional variables: 
 
  LnGap  =  the natural logarithm of the number of days between the IPO 
and the SEO. 
  LnSEOSZ  =   the natural logarithm of the issue size of the SEO. 
  SeoSize  =  the size of the SEO as a proportion of the total of the size of 
the IPO and the SEO. 
  PrestigUW  =  the rank of underwriters used in the SEO. 
  Hitech  =  Dummy variable if the issuing firms are from the hi-tech 
industry. 
 
The dependent variable is the three-day (-1, 1) abnormal returns of firms that 
announce SEOs. We obtain abnormal returns using standard event study 
methodology (Brown and Warner, 1985). We use the CRSP equally weighted 
index returns as the market index in the event study and the parameters for the 
market model are estimated over the (-266, -11) interval. To be included in the 
event study, issuing firms must have at least 100 days’ stock returns for the 
estimation period. This data requirement reduces the number of observations from 
70 to 61.
25 
  Table 9 presents the OLS estimates of the regression model. The estimate of 
the slope coefficient on the underpricing variable is positive and significant at the 
                                                 
25 This decline in the size of the sample is because there are several SEOs that are within three 
months of the IPO and that, therefore, do not meet the number of trading days’ requirement for the 
event study. If this requirement is relaxed, we obtain qualitatively similar results.  
26 
one percent level. This indicates, consistent with our conjecture, that the stock 
market reacts less unfavorably to SEO announcements by firms that had higher 
levels of underpricing at their IPO. Again, we find that segment-market firms 
determine this relationship. For firms from integrated markets, the slope 
coefficient on the IPO-underpricing variable is not significantly different from 





Welch (1989), among others, proposes a signalling model in which issuers convey 
their private information about the value of their firms by underpricing their IPOs. 
Empirical studies, however, have come up with at best weak support for the 
signalling hypothesis (see eg Jegadeesh, Weinstein and Welch, 1993). Using a 
sample of foreign firms coming to the US financial markets to issue IPOs, we re-
visit the signalling hypothesis as developed by Welch (1989) and find strong 
support for the signalling hypotheses for IPOs of firms from financially 
segmented countries. 
  We find that firms from segmented markets that experience relatively larger 
underpricing at IPOs are: a) subsequently more likely to issue seasoned equity; 
b) likely to raise larger amounts of capital in their seasoned offerings; c) likely to 
issue seasoned equity more quickly after their initial public offerings; and 
d) likely to experience a smaller price drop on the date of the SEO announcement. 
However, we do not find similar results for the group of firms from integrated 
markets. Firms from integrated markets, in contrast, tend to underprice at IPOs to 
purchase lead underwriter’s analyst coverage. For such firms, returns in the 
immediate post-IPO period are a better predictor of their SEO activities. 
Therefore, we conclude that the signalling hypothesis is a major determinant of 
IPO underpricing for firms from segmented markets, a group of firms that face 
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Table 1    Distribution of foreign IPOs and SEOs by market 
      segmentation and country 
 
This table presents the distribution of foreign IPOs in the US market from 1985 to 2000 and SEOs 
issued within three years of the IPO. We follow Bekaert and Harvey (1995) in identifying the 
issuing countries’ financial market integration status. We then augmented this sample with 
countries from Edison and Warnock (2003). The proceeds are in million US dollars. UP is the IPO 
underpricing and it is calculated as (P1-P0)/P0*100 in percentage terms, where P1 is the first day 
closing price; P0 is the initial offering price. All the SEOs are issued three years subsequent to the 
IPO. CARs is defined as the three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the SEO 
announcement date. 
 
                           IPO                                                    SEO                          









Segmented Markets         
Argentina 7  2,101.9  19.240  1  152.8  -0.062 
Bahamas 2  154.4  5.993  2  174.7  0.010 
Bermuda 29  5,234.9  12.950  8  1,931.4  -0.034 
Brazil 2  117.8  5.472  0  0  N/A 
British Virgin  2  20.0  2.432  0  0  N/A 
Cayman Islands  3  94.1  52.620  1  68.0  0.093 
Chile 15  888.8  9.096  4  739.7  -0.026 
China 12  2,133.0  1.643  0  0  N/A 
Cyprus 1  12  1.875  0  0  N/A 
Greece 4  376.3  5.336  0  0  N/A 
Hungary 2  319  36.598  0  0  N/A 
India 2  182.1  53.458  0  0  N/A 
Indonesia 3  443.2  -2.683  0  0  N/A 
Israel 81  1,990.3  16.325  10  701.5  -0.051 
Jordan 1  7.0  12.500  1  13.1  0.000 
Mexico 17  2,231.8  1.520  3  260.5  -0.041 
Monaco 1  31.5  0.000  0  0  N/A 
Neth. Antilles  3  213.6  -7.600  0  0  N/A 
Panama 3  90.3  -0.328  1  75.0  -0.005 
Peru 3  707.4  11.399  0  0  N/A 
Philippines 1  56.0  32.031  0 0  N/A 
Portugal 1  114.9  1.133  1  274.4  0.021 
Puerto Rico  6  183.5  10.254  0  0  N/A 
Russian Fed  1  136.7  4.070  0  0  N/A 
South Korea  3  1,324.3  4.144  3  1,421.1  -0.074 
Taiwan 3  606.8  2.814  1  75.7  -0.091 
Venezuela 1  534.4  12.500  1  53  -0.029 
Subtotal 209  20,306.0  12.204  37  5,940.9  -0.033 
           
Integrated Markets         
Australia 3  108.8  -0.686  0  0  N/A 
Belgium 3  121.2  18.183  1  73.3  -0.0197 
Canada 51  2,999.9  6.510  9  419.6  -0.022 
Denmark 3  1,302.1  12.197  0  0  N/A 
France 9  1,222.9  0.762  2  595.6  0.060 
Germany 3  442.7  5.362  0  0  N/A 
Hong Kong  27  1,759.4  10.984  2  219.2  0.013 
Ireland-Rep 10  407.8  19.070  2  69.1  -0.102 
Italy 9  1,429.3  4.744  2  805.1  0.017 
Japan 1  133.6  36.143  0  0  N/A 
Luxembourg 4  191.3  3.200  2  102.2  -0.019  
31 
                           IPO                                                    SEO                          









Netherlands 18  1,842.6  6.343  3  257.8  -0.114 
New Zealand  4  388.2  13.210  1  50.2  -0.011 
Norway 4  273.3  -2.021  1  206.5  -0.012 
Singapore 5  431.7  -3.679  2  591.7  -0.100 
South Africa  1  81.7  11.111  0  0  N/A 
Spain 2  360.7  14.947  0  0  N/A 
Sweden 4  266.5  7.105  1  141.5  -0.090 
Switzerland 4  260.8  17.681  0 0  N/A 
United Kingdom  39  2,539.3  7.602  5  551.7  0.004 
Sub Total  204  16563.8  7.843  33  4,083.5  -0.031 
Grand Total  413  36869,8  10.050  70  10,024.4  -0.032 
  
32 
Table 2    Descriptive statistics of the foreign IPOs and SEOs 
 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the 413 foreign IPOs issued from 1985–2000 in the 
US capital markets by issuing countries’ financial market integration status. Integrated refers to 
IPOs from countries with fully integrated financial markets. Segmented denotes IPOs from 
countries whose capital markets are not fully integrated. UP (Underpricing) = (P1-P0)/P0*100, 
where P1 is the first day closing price and P0 is the initial offering price. IPOSZ is size of the initial 
offerings in millions of US dollars. UWrank is a continuous measure of the underwriter rank from 
Loughran and Ritter (2004). NYSE is a dummy variable if the IPO is listed on the NYSE. ADR is 
a dummy variable when the IPO is identified as an ADR in the SDC database. Hitech refers to 
those IPOs issued by firms from hi-tech industries. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for 
IPOs and SEOs by issuing countries’ financial-market integration status. CARs is defined as the 
three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the SEO announcement date. SEOSZ is the size of 
the seasoned equity offerings in millions of US dollars. GAP is the number of days between an 
IPO and its first SEO. The t-statistics are from the tests of the differences in mean between the 
integrated IPOs (SEOs) and the segmented IPOs (SEOs). Figures in parentheses are standard 
deviations. 
 
Panel A. IPOs 
  All (n = 413)  Integrated 
(n = 204) 
Segmented 
(n = 209) 
Diff. 
 Mean  Std.  Mean  Mean  t-statistics 
UP  10.050  18.530  7.844 (13.968)  12.204 (21.915)  -2.405*** 
IPOSZ 89.000  164.000  81.000  (9.356) 97.000  (13.112)  0.987 
UWrank  7.017  2.774  6.937 (0.198)  7.095 (0.189)  0.579 
NYSE  0.305  0.461  0.240 (0.428)  0.368 (0.484)  -2.850*** 
ADR  0.366  0.482  0.417 (0.035)  0.316 (0.032)  2.135** 
Hitech  0.383  0.487  0.343 (0.033)  0.421 (0.034)  1.630* 
 
Panel B. SEOs 
  All (n = 70)  Integrated 
(n = 33) 
Segmented 
(n = 37) 
Diff. 
 Mean  Std.  Mean  Mean  t-statistics 
CARs  -0.024  0.063  -0.031 (0.014)  -0.033 (0.009)  0.128 
SEOSZ  141.000  224.000  123 (27.217)  157 (45.464)  0.621 
UWrank  7.886  2.077  7.949 (0.343)  7.830 (0.361)  0.237 
NYSE  0.386  0.490  0.333 (0.083)  0.432 (0.083)  0.842 
GAP  492  270  474 (47.341)  510 (45.704)  0.537 
Hitech  0.414  0.496  0.364 (0.085)  0.460 (0.083)  0.805 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The dependent variable is the abnormal SEO three-day announcement price reaction. UP is 
underpricing defined as (P1-P0)/P0. AFTRET1 and AFTRET2 are the abnormal returns in the two 
20-day periods after the IPO. LnSize is the natural logarithm of IPO size. LnGap is the natural 
logarithm of the time between SEO and IPO. LnSEOSZ is the natural logarithm of SEO issue size. 
Sizeratio is the SEO issue size as a proportion of the SEO issue size plus of the IPO size. 
PrestigUW is the rank of the SEO lead underwriter. Hitech is a dummy variable for firms from hi-
tech industries. Integrated includes firms that are from fully integrated markets and Segmented 
includes other firms. The sample consists of all SEOs from the 1987 to 2003 period that were 
issued within 3 years of the IPO. Coefficients are reported with heteroscadasticity consistent t-
statistics. p-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. 
 
 Full  Integrated  Segmented 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Constant 0.944  0.653  0.103 
 (0.215)  (0.571)  (0.935) 
UP/100  0.116*** -0.034 0.156*** 
 (0.004)  (0.794)  (0.000) 
AFTRET1 -0.070  -0.062  0.067 
 (0.185)  (0.303)  (0.365) 
AFTRET2 0.099**  0.140**  0.030 
 (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.520) 
LnSize -0.062  -0.049  -0.010 
 (0.164)  (0.497)  (0.894) 
LnGap 0.007  0.010  0.008 
 (0.577)  (0.641)  (0.601) 
LnSEOSZ 0.069  0.063  0.013 
 (0.133)  (0.406)  (0.872) 
Sizeratio -0.392*  -0.322  -0.107 
 (0.100)  (0.406)  (0.785) 
PrestigUW  0.029 0.074** 0.001 
 (0.118)  (0.046)  (0.946) 
Hitech -0.055***  -0.034  -0.062*** 
 (0.002)  (0.273)  (0.003) 
n 61  30  31 
Adj. R
2 0.445  0.628  0.657 
Prob>F 0.000  0.000  0.000 
The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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